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Abstract: This study evaluates technical efficiency (TE) levels for rural households under high 
and low levels of investments in soil conservation in El Salvador and Honduras. To correct for 
potential self-selectivity bias a household-level switching regression framework is implemented 
to estimate separate stochastic production frontiers for the two groups of households under 
analysis. The main results indicate that a systematic difference exists between the two studied 
groups. Specifically, households with higher levels of investments in soil conservation show 
higher average TE than those with a lower level of investments. Constrains in the rural land and 
credit markets appear to be the reason behind these differences. Our estimations indicate that for 
farms with lower levels of investments in soil conservation access to credit is a significant factor 
explaining the sources of inefficiency. Conversely, households with higher levels of investments 
in soil conservation present the highest partial output elasticity for land, the highest levels of TE 
and the smallest farms. This result could suggest the presence of a market failure in the land 
market which is denying access to land to the more efficient producers. 
 





Traditional agricultural practices in hillsides and the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
in Central America have been identified as major sources of watershed degradation in the area. 
In particular, soil erosion, which has negative impacts on farm productivity and environmental 
quality, is considered to be the most serious problem. Several authors, including Arellanes and 
Lee (2003), Kaimowitz (2001), and Conroy, Murray and Rosset (1996), have shown the severe 
social, environmental and economic consequences that arise from environmentally unsustainable 
traditional production practices in the region. Johnson and Baltodano (2004) highlight the 
reduction in quality of vast areas of agricultural land and the consequent decrease in farm-
productivity and rural-income. 
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  1In an effort to improve the environmental conditions in rural Central America and to 
reduce poverty among hillside producers, local governments with the support of international 
donors have undertaken several natural resource management programs during the last two 
decades. Two of these programs that deserve special attention because of the significance of the 
investments in terms of public spending are the Environmental Program for El Salvador (PAES) 
and the Natural Resource Management Program in Honduras (CAJON). Both programs, which 
have recently concluded, were aimed at conserving renewable natural resources in the upper 
watershed of the Lempa River in El Salvador and in the Cajón watershed in Honduras, 
respectively. An underlying objective of these programs was also to improve the socioeconomic 
conditions of the rural population in their area of influence. In doing so, these programs have 
promoted the use of soil conservation techniques and the adoption of a more diversified cropping 
pattern as their main strategy (Bravo-Ureta et al, 2003).  
Despite the targeted effort and financial resources invested in promoting soil 
conservation under these two programs, the rates of adoption and the factors influencing farmers’ 
decision to adopt the new technologies vary sharply among beneficiary farmers (Cocchi, 2004). 
This variation provides an opportunity to measure the magnitude of the expected gains in 
productivity resulting from different levels of investments in soil conservation. This type of 
analysis is useful for policy decision making because it facilitates the understanding of the 
circumstances under which promoting alternative soil conservation technologies may have their 
greatest impacts (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995). Consequently, the main goal of this study is to 
evaluate and analyze technical efficiency levels for rural-hillside households under different 
levels of investments in soil conservation in El Salvador and Honduras.  
To pursue this goal it will be necessary to estimate separate production functions for 
alternative groups of farms within the survey sample. Freeman, Ehui and Jabbar (1998) indicate 
that this estimation could be feasible if the levels of investments vary randomly among the 
studied farms. However, Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpongse (2004), and Pattanayak and Mercer 
(1998) indicate that this might not be the case in this kind of analysis since the adoption of a new 
technology is a voluntary choice exercised by the household. Thus, classifying farms into 
arbitrary groups and then estimating individual production functions for each group of farms 
could generate a self-selection problem in which case the estimated parameters would be biased. 
  2Pattanayak and Mercer (1998) argue that this self-selection bias is different from the 
traditional one in which data for nonadopters is not available. In our case, the self-selection issue 
arises from the arbitrary classification of farms into groups. Maddala (1983) explains that by 
creating such subsamples the observations in each subset will no longer be randomly selected 
from the population given that the data in each subsample now depends on the variables 
affecting the adoption of the technology under analysis.   
Therefore, to account for the potential self-selection bias that may arise in the models to 
be estimated in this study, a switching regression framework is proposed. Generally speaking, 
this methodology uses a two-step approach in which a choice model is first used to determine the 
factors affecting farmers’ decision to adopt a new technology. Next, based on the results of the 
choice model a set of self-selectivity variables is generated following Lee (1978). The latter 
variables are then incorporated into the productivity model in order to correct for the potential 
self-selection problem and thus compute unbiased parameters.  
The rest of this paper is divided into five additional sections. The next section presents 
the theoretical framework, followed by a description of the empirical model and the data set. The 
subsequent section presents and discusses the main results of this analysis while the last section 
provides some concluding remarks.   
 
II. SWITCHING REGRESSION MODEL 
In general terms, a switching regression model corrects for self-selection bias by 
introducing a set of self-selectivity variables into the productivity model. In doing so, the first 
step in this model is to determine the factors influencing farmers’ decisions to invest in soil 
conservation.        
Following Freeman, Ehui and Jabbar (1998) the level of investment in soil conservation 
can be described by a criterion function, which is postulated to be associated with exogenous 
household socioeconomic variables as follows:  
 
i i i u Z I 0
' + =δ           ( 1 )    
where subscript i denotes farm-households, I is the level of investment in soil conservation, Z is 
a vector of exogenous variables, δ are the unknown parameters and uo is the disturbance term.  
  Petersen (2001) indicates that to obtain robust results it is best to classify the data set into 
a few broad groups. This author argues that the separation of the data into several narrow groups 
  3m duce significantly the variation among observations within each subgroup thus affecting 
the statistical significance of the econometric outcomes. Therefore, in our study two investment 
levels are proposed - high and low - with the sample mean as the breakpoint. By doing so, the 
dependent variable is now dichotomous (i.e., I = 1 for a high level of investment and 0 
otherwise) and the parameters in equation (1) can be estimated using a choice model such as the 
probit. 
The second step in the switching regression model is to compute production functions for 
the two
ay re
 groups of farmers (i.e., farmers with high and low levels of investment in soil 
conserv
( 2 )  
2
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here  Y1 and Y  represent output levels for farm-households with high and low levels of 
vestments in soil conservation, respectively,  1 2
ation).  These production functions can be expressed in reduced form as: 
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w 2
X  and X  are vectors of exogenous variables,  in
1 β and 2 β are the unknown parameters, and u1 and u2 are random disturbance terms (Feder et al, 
1990).  
addala (1983) indicates that estimating the unknown parameters, 1    M β and 2 β , using OLS 
will yield inconsistent estimates because the expected values of the error terms, conditional on 
 r m
ns, Lee (1978) suggests a two-step estimation method 
the sample selection criterion, are non-zero. Furthermore, he argue that the ando  disturbance 
terms, u0, u1 and u2 (equations 1, 2 and 3, respectively) are assumed to have a trivariate normal 
distribution with zero mean and non-singular covariance matrix. Thus, in order to obtain 
unbiased estimators it will be necessary to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) simultaneously 
using maximum likelihood techniques.  
  The estimation of this system of equations via maximum likelihood is feasible but 
complicated. To simplify the calculatio
where he treats self-selectivity as a missing variable problem. In this model, the error terms are 
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where  =var(u1),  =var(u2),  =var(u0),  =cov(u1,u2),  =cov(u1,u0) and 
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where Z and δ are, respectively, the vector of exogenous variables and the estimated parameters 
from equation (1), and the expressions φ  and Φ are, the probability density and the cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively. 
Therefore, based on Lee (1978), the revised system of equations can be expressed as 
follows: 
i i i i W X Y 1 1 10 1
'
1 1 ε σ β + + =  if  I  =  HIGH       (7) 
  
i i i i W X Y 2 2 20 2
'
2 2 ε σ β + + =   if I  =   L O W        ( 8 )    
 
where W1 and W2 are the self-selectivity variables derived, respectively, in equations (5) and (6). 
The coefficients of these variables provide estimates of the covariance terms σ10, and σ20. If the 
covariances are nonzero then the estimation of equation (2) and (3) would be biased due to self-
selection. Otherwise, equations (7) and (8) will collapse to equations (2) and (3), respectively 
(Fuglie and Boch, 1995; Pitt, 1983). Finally, ε1 and ε2 are the new residuals with zero conditional 
mean. Freeman, Ehui and Jabbar (1998) show that these residuals are heteroscedastic and 
suggest estimating equations (7) and (8) by Weighted Least Square (WLS) to obtain efficient 
parameters.   
  5  Sriboonchitta and Wibonnpongse (2004) suggest that the methodology described above 
can also be used to modify the stochastic production frontier (SPF) model in order to estimate 
efficient parameters under self-selectivity bias. Coelli (1995) states that the SPF is preferable to 
the average production function method because the former provides the shape of the technology 
for the best performing decision-making units. Thus, the frontier approach allows us to evaluate 
the effective gap between current farm productivity and the potential productivity level given the 
technology available in a specific geographical area.  
Consequently, using the SPF method proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), 
and Meeüsen and van den Broeck (1977), equations (7) and (8) may be expressed as follows:  
 
i i i i i u v W X Y 1 1 1 10 1
'
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i i i i i u v W X Y 2 2 2 20 2
'
2 2 − + + = σ β   if I  =  LOW      (10) 
 
where vi, is a random variable reflecting noise and other stochastic shocks entering into the 
definition of the frontier, such as weather, luck, etc., and ui captures the technical inefficiency 
relative to the stochastic frontier. The maximum likelihood estimation of equations (9) and (10) 
will produce consistent parameter and efficiency estimates for the stochastic production frontiers.  
A further refinement is to analyze the extent to which certain variables are correlated with 
the inefficiency term ui.  To accomplish this, the most common option is the one developed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) where, in a single-stage maximum likelihood approach, the technical 
inefficiency effects are estimated as a function of farm-specific variables. Hence, using this 
approach, the parameters of the production frontier as well as those of the technical inefficiency 
factors are estimated jointly. Thus, technical inefficiency can be estimated by incorporating the 
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where ui are the inefficiency effects defined as normal random variables truncated at zero, Fni  is a 
vector of household-specific variables, αn are unknown parameters and e are unobservable random 
variables, assumed to be independently distributed. 
 
  6III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
  As indicated earlier, the first step in estimating the switching regression model is to 
investigate farmers’ decisions to invest in soil conservation. According to neoclassical theory, 
farmers would adopt new technologies as long as these technologies bring net economic benefits 
(Scherr, 2000; Saín and Barreto, 1996). However, it is well documented that the reason why 
farmers adopt a new technology goes beyond the neoclassical rationale. Since the pioneering 
work by Ryan and Gross (1943), a wealth of studies has analyzed the variables affecting the 
adoption of new technologies in the agricultural sector. Detailed reviews of this literature can be 
found in Lichtenberg (2001), Rogers (1995), Feder and Umali (1993), Lindner (1987), and 
Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985).  
Typically, the variables affecting the adoption of a new technology have been classified 
into the following groups: 1) human capital; 2) structural factors; and 3) social capital (Rogers, 
1995). With respect to human capital, it is customary to evaluate the effect of age, gender, 
education, literacy, agricultural experience and training. Among structural factors, farm size, 
land tenure and credit have been widely analyzed. Lastly, recent studies have focused on 
evaluating the effect of access to social networks and institutions on a farmer’s perception of a 
new technology and their subsequent effect on the adoption process (e.g., Winters, Crissman, and 
Espinosa, 2004; Shultz, Faustino and Melgar, 1997). 
With regards to the adoption of soil conservation technologies, previous research and 
economic theory suggest that variables such as farmers’ perceptions of soil erosion problems in 
the area, household attributes and assets, plot slope, land use patterns and location are relevant in 
the development of an appropriate model (Lichtenberg, 2001; Lindner, 1987). 
Based on the literature and the available data, the adoption function used in this study can 
be summarized as follows. First, the dependent variable in the probit model (equation 1) is a 
dichotomous (dummy) variable reflecting the level of investment in soil conservation practices in 
the farm. This variable takes the value of 1 if the farm puts more than 50% of its surface under 
soil conservation practices (i.e., crop residual mulching, minimum tillage, crop rotation, green 
manure and/or contour tillage) or 0 otherwise. A 50% level was selected because it is the average 
level of investment in soil conservation among the sampled households. In addition, the 50% 
point divides the sample into to two groups of approximately equal size.   
  7The explanatory variables, including both continuous and dummy variables, are: AGE, 
the age of the household head; EDUCATION, the average level of education for household 
members that are 10 years of age or older
2; GENDER, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household head is a male; FAMILY SIZE, the total number of people in the household; LAND, 
the total area of cultivated land measured in Manzanas (1 Mz = 0.7 hectares); SLOPE, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the average slope in the farm is greater than 15%; OWNERSHIP, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the household owns more than 50% of the land cultivated; FREQUENCY, 
the number of visits made by an extensionist to the farm during the last agricultural year; 
YEARS,  the number of years that the farmer has participated in the projects under study; 
CREDIT, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the farm uses credit; PERCEPTION, a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the farmer expresses awareness and knowledge of the erosion problem in the area; 
and PARTICIPATION, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head participates in a social 
organization (e.g., farmer’s and community associations).  
To account for a possible project effect a set of dummy variables are included in this 
model (i.e., PAES 1, PAES 2 and PAES 3, with CAJON as the excluded category). PAES is 
treated as three separate projects because each one of these subprojects has been implemented in 
different agroecological regions of the Lempa River watershed and executed by independent 
extension programs, each with its own methodologies and approaches to extension services. 
The second-step in the switching regression model is to estimate the SPF model for farms 
under high and low levels of investment in soil conservation (i.e., equations 9 and 10, 
respectively). In general, productivity analyses in peasant economies are usually undertaken at 
the farm-level (Thiam, Bravo-Ureta and Rivas, 2001). However, using the farm as the unit of 
analysis to study productivity in developing countries has come under scrutiny. Specifically, 
Chavas, Petrie and Roth (2005) argue that performing efficiency studies at the farm-level in an 
environment with market imperfections may be inappropriate. These authors contend that farm-
level analyses neglect possible labor allocation inefficiency between farm and non-farm 
activities and that the decisions regarding both of these activities are often made jointly.  
In addition, it is important to indicate that farm-level analysis usually includes off-farm 
earnings as an explanatory variable in the production frontier. However, this strategy has been 
                                                 
2 Rogers (1995) indicates that in rural areas in less developed countries, children that are 10 or older have, in 
general, sufficient reading and writing skills to help their parents in several household and business related activities.  
  8criticized for potentially introducing endogeneity bias because both farm and non-farm activities 
may be correlated with the same unobserved variables. Typically the literature has addressed this 
problem by implementing instrumental variables (Jolliffe, 1998). In contrast, the household-level 
model proposed by Chavas, Petrie and Roth (2005) includes off-farm income as part of the 
dependent variable (or variables if a multi-output approach is used) in the productivity model, 
which controls for the potential endogeneity problem. 
Therefore, a household production model along the lines proposed by Chavas, Petrie and 
Roth (2005) is implemented in this study. In doing so, the dependent variable in the second-stage 
is the total value of household production. This variable, measured in US dollars, represents the 
sum of a household’s agricultural production (including self-consumption) and off-farm 
earnings. The values for agricultural production were calculated based on total production 
quantities and selling prices reported by the farmers. Off-farm earnings were measured as the 
total value of income generated outside of the farm by household members. It includes income 
accruing from either employment in the rural non-farm labor market, self-employment in the 
local non-farm sector, or employment in the farm labor market.  
The literature shows that the variables that affect farm and household production most 
significantly can be classified into two broad groups: 1) farm characteristics; and 2) production 
inputs (Gorton and Davidova, 2004; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro 1997; Coelli and Battese, 1996). 
Specifically, the explanatory variables included in the frontier production models are: LAND; 
SLOPE; and, PURCHASED INPUTS equal to the total expenditure in variable inputs (US$) 
including the cost of seeds, fertilizer and pesticides. Total labor has been divided into three 
different categories. The labor used in farm production is disaggregated into FAMILY LABOR, 
measured in worker days, and HIRED LABOR, measured in US dollars. This division of 
agricultural labor is consistent with the view that, in developing countries, family and hired labor 
may not be perfect substitutes and thus should be considered separately in the characterization of 
a production function (Taylor and Adelman, 2004). In the absence of data on off-farm labor, the 
total number of people in the household over the age of 15 (ADULTS) was used as a proxy for 
labor availability. A similar approach can be found in Chavas, Petrie and Roth (2005). As in the 
probit model, the dummy variables PAES 1, PAES 2 and PAES 3 are included to account for any 
project effects. To correct for the potential selectivity bias the frontier functions include the self-
selectivity variables W1 and W2, discussed in Section II.  
  9Finally, the specification of the inefficiency effects component includes several 
socioeconomic, human and social capital variables selected based on the available data and on 
the literature (Gorton and Davidova, 2004; Coelli and Battese, 1996; Kalaitzandonakes and 
Dunn, 1995; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). The variables AGE, EDUCATION and GENDER 
are included to account for any possible effect of farmers’ characteristics on efficiency. In 
addition, FREQUENCY and YEARS are used to evaluate the effect of the extension program on 
this model, and the variables CREDIT, OWNERSHIP and PARTICIPATION are included as 
proxies for managerial ability and social capital. Table I presents a summary description of each 
variable used in the analysis.  
 
IV. DATA 
The data used in this study consist of detailed household-level information obtained from 
surveys administered to farmers participating in the PAES (El Salvador) and CAJON (Honduras) 
projects. These projects have sought to increase household income through improved soil 
productivity, the adoption of conservation technologies and product diversification through a 
series of activities and instruments, including farm extension programs, education and training, 
community engagement, targeted investments under cost sharing mechanisms, marketing, and 
environmental awareness programs. 
The households included in the data set were selected randomly from lists of producers 
associated with each project and the interviews were conducted between May and August 2002. 
The data from El Salvador include a total of 530 farm households drawn from a listing of all 
beneficiaries located in 102 communities of the Lempa River Watershed. In Honduras, 210 
households associated with the 240 communities participating in the CAJON project were 
interviewed. In sum, the whole database has 740 observations; however, all surveys with missing 
or incomplete data necessary for this study were excluded from the analysis. Thus, the final data 
set encompasses a total of 639 observations
3. 
Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the whole data set as well as for the two 
groups of households under analysis (i.e., households with high and low levels of investment in 
                                                 
3 A thorough analysis of the deleted observations revealed no systematic pattern with respect to farm size, household 
income or any of the other key socioeconomic variables used in the analysis. In addition, the deleted observations 
are distributed evenly among the projects. Thus, no biases are expected from the data cleaning that was necessary to 
estimate the models for this study.   
  10soil conservation). The descriptive statistics reveal several important points. For instance, the 
average total household income reaches $2,110.6 of which 25% comes from off-farm activities. 
The typical project participant operates about 6 Mz (4.2 hectares). In addition, most of the 
farmers (70%) own more than 50% of the land they operate, are middle-aged men (83%) and 
have very limited access to rural credit and formal education. 
An interesting pattern is found between the two groups of households under analysis. In 
general, farms with a higher percentage of their land under soil conservation practices are the 
youngest, have a higher average level of education and higher household income. Conversely, 
the farms with a lower percentage of their land under soil conservation practices are larger and 
have higher levels of off-farm income. These statistics appears to confirm the findings presented 
by Solís and Bravo-Ureta (2005) and Sander, Southgate and Lee (1995) who suggest that, in 
less-developed countries, more conservative producers retreat to subsistence crops (where they 
use few inputs generating low returns) and engage in as much off-farm work as they can, in order 
to obtain the necessary means to support their families.  
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  This section presents the results obtained with the switching regression model. The next 
subsection describes the empirical results of the probit adoption model, followed by a discussion 
of the outcome of the efficiency analysis.  
 
A.   First-Stage: Probit Model 
Table III presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model. This table 
displays the estimated coefficients along with their respective marginal effects. Marginal effects 
measure the change in the probability of adoption due to a one unit change of a specific 
explanatory variable. The marginal effects for the dummy variables are estimated by taking the 
difference between the value of the prediction when the exogenous variable equals 1 and when it 
equals 0 (STATA, 2003). By contrast, the marginal effects (M.E.) for the continuous variables 
are estimated using the following formula: 
 
δ δ φ ) ( M.E. Z =           ( 1 2 )  
 
  11where φ  is the probability density function, Z is the vector of exogenous variables and δ are the 
estimated parameters. The marginal effects are measured at the mean value of the regressors 
(Madalla, 1983). 
  As is shown in Table III, the model correctly predicts farmers’ decision to invest in soil 
conservation practices for 75.2% of the observations. In addition, the likelihood ratio test reveals 
that jointly all slope coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  The main 
results of the probit model can be summarized as follows. Individually, eight out of the 16 
estimated parameters are statistically different from zero and most of them present signs 
consistent with what would be expected.  For instance, the average level of education of the 
household and the frequency of visits by an extensionist to the farm present positive and 
significant parameters. This finding is consistent with the idea that human capital formation, 
through formal education, agricultural training and technical assistance, is essential in helping 
farmers to better understand the attributes of new technologies (Rogers, 1995; Feder and Umali, 
1993).  
OWNERSHIP displays a positive and significant effect on investments in soil 
conservation.  Specifically, farmers who own most of the land they operate are 41% more likely 
to adopt soil conservation practices than those who either rent or have no legal title on their plots. 
Shultz, Faustino and Melgar (1997), and Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994) argue that ownership 
reduces risk and consequently enhances expected returns encouraging farmers to invest in more 
productive technologies. However, the empirical literature presents mixed results in this regard. 
In fact, contradictory outcomes are reported by Ramírez and Shultz (2000), Lee and Stewart 
(1983), and de Herrera and Saín (1999).   
The positive and significant effect of PERCEPTION indicates that those producers who 
express knowledge of the erosion problem on their farms have a higher probability of investing 
in soil conservation practices than those who are unaware of this problem. More precisely, the 
former group of farmers has approximately 8% higher probability to invest in conservation than 
the latter group. These results suggest that environmental awareness is an important pre-
condition for the adoption of conservation technologies. Similar findings have reported by 
Mbaga-Semgalawe and Fomer (2000), and Norris and Batie (1987).  
LAND presents a negative and significant parameter revealing an inverse relationship 
between the probability to invest in soil conservation and total area cultivated. Rogers (1995) 
  12explains that, in many cases, producers with smaller farms tend to be more innovative in their 
production techniques. Deininger, Zegarra and Lavadenz (2003) indicate that, in developing 
countries, an imperfect rural land market can lead to smaller farms than desired and, in these 
cases, family labor is in abundance and available to implement alternative production methods. 
However, it is important to note that the opposite outcome was reported by Westra and Olson 
(1997), and Bonnard (1995).   
The dummy variables PAES 1, PAES 2 and PAES 3 capture the individual effects of 
these projects with respect to the CAJON project (the omitted variable).  All three PAES projects 
present positive parameters and two out of the three are statistically significant. These results 
suggest that farmers associated with PAES are more likely to adopt soil conservation practices 
than those working with CAJON. A possible explanation for this result might be the different 
strategies used by these projects to promote the adoption of soil conservation technologies 
among their beneficiaries. For instance, PAES introduced an array of incentives, such as 
subsidies and cost sharing mechanisms, to assist farmers in the adoption process. On the other 
hand, CAJON only employed subsidized inputs on its extension programs.   
 
B.  Second-Stage: Productivity Analysis  
Table VI contains the second-stage estimates of the switching regression model 
developed in this paper. Three different SPFs were estimated to evaluate the effect of investing 
in soil conservation on household productivity. The HIGH and LOW models analyze 
productivity among farms with corresponding levels of investments in soil conservation 
practices. These models include the self-selectivity variables W1 and W2 estimated from the 
results obtained in the fist-stage of this analysis. If self-selection is not present then the 
parameters associated with W1 and W2 are not statistically different from zero and the direct 
estimation of the production model for each group of farmers should yield unbiased estimates 
(Freeman, Ehui and Jabbar, 1998). 
  As mentioned in Section II, the incorporation of the self-selectivity variables into the 
productivity model introduces heteroscedasticity (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995). Therefore, the Lee, 
Maddala and Trost (1980) procedure was implemented to calculate the correct asymptotic 
covariance matrix in order to obtain robust estimates for the standard errors. Goetz (1990) 
indicates that even though this correction is typically avoided in the empirical literature, 
  13uncorrected standard errors could be overstated by more than 200% if the appropriate correction 
is not performed. For comparison, a SPF was also estimated for the entire sample (ALL). 
    The SPF models were estimated using the translog functional form given that in 
preliminary analyses the Cobb-Douglas specification was rejected.  Following common practice, 
all variables in these models are normalized by their geometric mean prior to estimation. Thus, 
the first-order coefficients can be interpreted as partial production elasticities at the geometric mean 
of the sample (Alvarez and Arias, 2004). At the point of approximation, the three SPF models 
satisfy monotonicity and convexity.  Monotonicity is verified by the positive value of all partial 
elasticities of production. On the other hand, the bordered Hessian matrixes, at the point of 
approximation, are negative semi-definite for all three models implying diminishing marginal 
productivities and thus convexity (Chambers, 1988).  
The values for σ
2 and γ  are reported at the end of Table VI.  The null hypothesis that γ  = 
0 is rejected in all cases (Table V) which suggests that technical inefficiency is indeed stochastic.  
Moreover, the value forγ  is statistically significant and ranges from 0.672 to 0.832, which 
indicates that inefficiency is highly significant in determining the output levels and variability.   
  The parameters for the selectivity variables W1 and W2 are statistically significant, which 
supports the estimation of the SPF using the switching regression approach.  Furthermore, Fuglie 
and Bosch (1995) suggest that the signs of the parameters for W1 and W2 (i.e., σ10 and σ20) have 
important economic interpretations. Assuming profit maximization, these authors conclude that 
if σ10 and σ20 display the same sign, which is the case reported in this analysis, households with 
higher levels of adoption of the new technology also have higher levels of total output. Thus, 
these results indicate that investing in soil conservation is an appropriate alternative for 
improving total household production among the sampled farmers.  
The SPF results show that out of the 25 estimated coefficients 16 and 14 are significant at 
least at the 10% level in the HIGH and LOW models, respectively. In addition, 15 out of the 24 
estimated coefficients in the ALL model are significant at least at the 10% level. The 
significance of several cross products and squared terms confirms the selection of the translog 
functional form over the Cobb-Douglas. 
In general, the estimated production elasticities follow similar patterns in the three 
estimated models; however, their magnitudes differ. Table VI shows that, at the geometric mean 
of the data, FAMILY LABOR and PURCHASED INPUTS contribute the most to the total value of 
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LABOR, while model LOW presents the largest elasticity for PURCHASED INPUTS.  
The three variables used to evaluate the effect of labor on output display positive 
parameters in all estimated models. Nevertheless, the statistical significance of these parameters 
varies among them. For instance, the parameters for FAMILY LABOR and ADULTS are 
statistically different from zero in all cases. However, the parameter for HIRED LABOR is 
significant only in model LOW. It is important to indicate that the effect of labor on productivity 
presents mix results in the literature. For example, González (2004), and López and Valdéz 
(2000) report positive and significant effects of labor on output among peasant farmers in 
Colombia and Central America, respectively. By contrast, no significant effects are reported by 
Alvarez and Arias (2004), Wadud and White (2000), Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta (1995), and 
Squires and Tabor (1991) in their studies in Northern Spain, Bangladesh, Northeastern USA and 
Indonesia, respectively.    
Farm size presents positive but small effects in all estimated models. Indeed, the partial 
elasticity for LAND in model HIGH is 0.144, indicating that a 10% rise in total cultivated area 
could increase total household production by 1.44%. Lastly, all project variables display positive 
coefficients suggesting that farmers associated with PAES (1, 2 and 3) have higher levels of 
productivity than those working with CAJON. 
At the point of approximation, the returns to scale are equal to 0.87, 0.82 and 0.75 for 
models HIGH, ALL and LOW, respectively. These results suggest the presence of decreasing 
returns to scale (DRTS) among the sampled households. Chavas, Petrie and Roth (2005) indicate 
that in household-level analyses, the presence of DRTS implies that household resources are ‘too 
large’ for the technology implemented. Given that the farms under analysis are small in terms of 
land area, the source of DRTS is most likely due to the average number of adults per household. 
Chavas, Petrie and Roth (2005) suggest that this problem may be offset by promoting off-farm 
employment opportunities in the area.      
The empirical results also show that the average levels of TE are 0.83, 0.77 and 0.74 for 
models HIGH, ALL and LOW, respectively. Based on paired t-tests, the differences among these 
means are statistically different from zero suggesting that households with higher levels of 
investment in soil conservation exhibit, on average, higher TE as well. These results also reveal 
considerable inefficiency levels where, on average, households could, in theory, reduce the level 
  15of inputs from 16.0% to 25.0% and still generate the same level of earnings. It is important to 
indicate that these TE levels are well within the range reported by Bravo-Ureta et al (2004) in 
their meta-regression analysis of TE studies in agriculture. These authors show that the average 
TE for stochastic studies in Latin America is approximately 0.78.  
Table VI also presents the determinants of technical inefficiency for each of the models 
estimated. Following common practice the interpretation of the parameters is performed with 
respect to their effect on efficiency. In doing so, the estimated coefficients are analyzed as if they 
display the inverse sign. As expected, EDUCATION and FREQUENCY display positive and 
statistically significant effects in all three models. Gorton and Davidova (2004), and Abdulai and 
Eberlin (2001) suggest that improvements in human capital enhance household efficiency by 
offering peasants the necessary means to achieve more with the available resources and the 
existing technology.  
The gender of the household head affects TE significantly in all three models. More 
precisely, female-headed households present lower levels of efficiency than male-headed 
households. Similar outcomes have been reported by several authors including Deininger, 
Castagnini and González (2004), González (2004), Fleming and Lummani (2001), López and 
Valdés (2000), and different hypothesis have been proposed to explain this result. For instance, 
López and Valdés (2000) suggest that this finding does not necessarily mean that females are 
less efficient but may be related to the different kinds of production activities performed by male 
and females in Central America. González (2004) argues that gender inequalities, prevalent in 
rural Latin America, limit the access of women to information, land, capital and other inputs and 
this can adversely affect TE. This difference could also be explained by unmeasured non-
economic activities performed by females in the household. Generally, in less developed areas, 
female household-heads are not only in charge of their family business but they also take care of 
basic household needs; namely, child care, cooking, cleaning, etc. However, to test this 
hypothesis detailed intrahousehold information is required, which is not available for this study; 
thus, this area merits further research. 
CREDIT presents a positive effect on household efficiency but it is statistically 
significant only in the model LOW. The literature shows mixed results with regards to the effect 
of credit assistance on productivity (e.g., Deininger, Castagnini and González, 2004; Binam et al, 
2003; Yadav and Rahman, 1994). Nonetheless, the outcomes of this analysis suggest that 
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Therefore, extension programs should take advantage of this situation and focus credit assistance 
on this group of households where credit presents a positive and significant effect for 
productivity improvement.   
Finally, the coefficient for OWNERSHIP is negative in all models but statistically 
significant only in the HIGH model. This suggests that TE decreases with land ownership, 
contradicting the neoclassical notion that land ownership is an economic incentive for farmers to 
improve their production technologies. Nevertheless, this seemingly contradictory finding has 
been reported in other studies (e.g., Deininger, Castagnini and González, 2004; Binam et al, 
2003; Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996, among others). Deininger, Zegarra and Lavadenz (2003) 
claim that this result could be explained by the prevalence of imperfect rural land markets, which 
may restrict access to land to farmers, including those that may be the most technically efficient 
in a given geographical area.  
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this study was to assess the connection between the adoption of soil 
conservation practices on household technical efficiency by comparing two types of rural farm-
households in hillside regions of Honduras and El Salvador. A switching regression approach 
was used to test if there is a systematic difference between households with high and low levels 
of investment in soil conservation. A specific methodological and empirical issue addressed on 
this paper is the determination of whether there is an unobserved mechanism at work that leads 
farmers to self-select into these two groups.   If such a mechanism is at work then the 
conventional estimation of separate production models for each group may lead to biased 
parameter estimates.  
A switching regression model corrects for this potential self-selectivity problem using a 
two-stage procedure. First, a probit model is estimated to evaluate the variables affecting soil 
conservation investments among the sampled households. Then, based on the results of the 
probit model, a set of self-selectivity variables are estimated. Finally, those self-selectivity 
variables are introduced into two stochastic production frontiers to account for the potential self-
selectivity problem and compute unbiased estimators. The empirical analysis corroborates 
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under study. 
The results can be summarized as follows. First, the probit model indicates that 
education, soil erosion awareness and frequency of rural extension visits play a positive and 
significant role in determining the level of adoption of conservation practices. Land ownership 
also displays a positive and significant effect. By contrast, land size shows a negative and 
significant effect on adoption, indicating that smaller farms have a higher probability to be 
engaged in soil conservation activities than larger ones.  
The second-step analysis reveals that producers with higher levels of investments in soil 
conservation also exhibit higher average technical efficiency. These producers also have the 
smallest farms and present the highest partial elasticity of production with respect to total 
cultivated land. These results suggest the presence of a market failure in the land market in area 
under analysis. Deininger, Zegarra and Lavadenz (2003) claim that market failures in less-
favorable areas denies access to land to many efficient rural producers. Vogelgesang (1998) 
suggests that a workable approach to handle these market failures is to strengthen the rental land 
market and to offer farmers the necessary financial support so that they can afford to rent 
additional land. 
Conversely, farms with lower levels of investment in soil conservation display the 
highest elasticities for purchased inputs and hired labor. In addition, accessibility to financial 
credit is found to be a factor in explaining the sources of inefficiency, suggesting the presence of 
credit constraints. Thus, resource management programs should consider targeting credit 
programs to these households as a strategy for development and productivity improvement as 
well as for helping farmers to undertake the initial investments to adopt soil conservation 
techniques. Improved access to financial resources will also allow this group of farmers to 
acquire more inputs and to hire external labor. 
All three models show positive and significant effects of education and extension on 
technical efficiency. These results are not surprising since the average level of formal education 
among the sampled households is only 3.6 years. Furthermore, the analysis reveals substantial 
inefficiency for household production in El Salvador and Honduras, indicating considerable 
potential for profitability improvement. Thus, rural development projects in the area should focus 
  18on improving farmers’ human capital by supporting agricultural training, extension and 
educational programs.  
Finally, households associated with the PAES projects not only show higher average 
levels of technical efficiency than those working with CAJON but they also display a higher 
probability of investing in soil conservation technologies. These differences are likely due to the 
unique strategies, methodologies and incentives used in each of the two projects. This is an 
important issue that requires further work.  However, to isolate the impact of project design and 
implementation it is necessary to have a much richer data set, including a control group, than the 
one available for this study. 




   
Age  Age of the household head 
Education  Average level of education for household’s members ≥10 years old 
Gender  1 if the household head is a man (dummy) 
Family Size  Number of people in the household 
Land  Total number of Manzanas devoted to agricultural production 
Slope  1 if the average slope is greater than 15% (dummy) 
Ownership  1 if the household owns more than 50% of the farm (dummy) 
Frequency  Number of visits by an extensionist to the farm 
Years  Number of years involve with the projects 
Credit  1 if the household uses financial credit (dummy) 
Perception  1 if farmer is aware of the erosion problem in the area 
Participation  1 if the household head participate in an organization (dummy) 
Household Income  Total household income (US$) 
Off-Farm Income  Wage labor in off-farm activities (US$) 
Purchased Inputs  Total expenditure in variable inputs (US$) 
Family Labor  Total family labor (working days) 
Hired Labor  Total hired labor (US$) 
Adults  Number of people in the household over the age of 15 
Practices  Percentage of total land with soil conservation practices 
PAES 1  Household involved with PAES 1 (dummy) 
PAES 2  Household involved with PAES 2 (dummy) 
PAES 3  Household involved with PAES 3 (dummy) 
CAJON  Household involved with CAJON (dummy) 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
All  High Level of Investment  Low Level of Investment  Variable 
Mean  St Dev  Max  Min  Mean  St Dev  Max  Min  Mean  St Dev  Max  Min 
Practices  0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.0 
Age  48.0        14.5 88.0 19.0 46.4 14.1 85.0 19.0 49.5 14.1 88.0 19.0
Education  3.6        2.2 13.5 0.0 3.7 2.3 13.5 0.0 3.3 2.1 12.0 0.0
Gender  0.9  --          -- -- 0.9  -- -- -- 0.9 0.3 -- -- 
Family Size  5.3        2.4 10.0 1.0 5.4 2.5 10.0 1.0 5.2 2.4 10.0 1.0
Land  5.9        13.5 181.0 0.4 2.8 2.8 26.0 0.4 8.8 18.1 181.0 0.6
Slope  0.6  --          -- -- 0.6  -- -- -- 0.6 0.5 -- -- 
Ownership  0.7  --                -- -- 0.8  -- -- -- 0.6 0.5 -- --
Frequency  2.0        1.1 3.0 0.0 1.9 1.1 3.0 0.0 2.1 1.1 3.0 0.0
Years  3.1        1.1 6.0 0.0 3.1 1.1 6.0 0.0 3.1 1.2 6.0 0.0
Credit  0.3  --          -- -- 0.3  -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 -- -- 
Perception  0.81  --                  -- -- 0.93  -- -- -- 0.69 -- -- --
Participation  0.6  --                  -- -- 0.6  -- -- -- 0.6 -- -- --
H. Income  2,110.6        2,763.6 40,131.6 110.3 2,347.9 3,134.9 40,131.6 200.0 1,860.4 2,286.8 26,313.8 110.3
Off-Farm Income  541.0        1,015.9 13,750.0 0.0 517.4 1,180.5 13,750.0 0.0 565.9 808.0 7,125.0 0.0
Purchased Inputs  657.8 997.6 13,727.2 42.0 799.9  1,286.5 13,727.2    44.4 507.9 508.5 4,183.3 42.0
Family Labor  43.5      53.8 583.3 3.4 47.1 64.0 583.3 3.4 39.7 40.0 278.3 3.9
Hired Labor  20.3        33.5 360.3 0.0 24.6 40.4 360.3 0.0 15.6 23.4 171.9 0.0
Adults  3.0        2.0 8.0 1.0 2.8 1.9 7.0 1.0 3.5 2.3 8.0 1.0
PAES 1  148  --        -- -- 97 --  --  --  58 --  --  -- 
PAES 2  162  --                    -- -- 83 -- -- -- 79 -- -- --
PAES 3  155  --                    -- -- 64 -- -- -- 84 -- -- --
CAJON  174  --                    -- -- 84 -- -- -- 90 -- -- --
       
No. of Households  639  328    311
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First-Stage Probit Model 
 
Variable
1 Coefficient St  Error  Marginal 
Effect 
Constant  3.807** 1.873  -- 
Age  -0.050 0.168  -0.020 
Education  0.053** 0.023  0.021 
Gender  0.091 0.150 0.036 
Family Size  -0.015 0.021  -0.006 
Land  -0.121*** 0.017 -0.047 
Slope  -0.056 0.106  -0.056 
Ownership  0.412*** 0.127 0.412 
Frequency  0.099** 0.046  0.039 
Years  0.018 0.053 0.007 
Credit  0.001 0.001 0.001 
Perception  0.075** 0.029  0.075 
Participation  -0.038 0.116  -0.038 
PAES 1  0.228** 0.108  -- 
PAES 2  0.205* 0.125  -- 
PAES 3  0.066 0.231  -- 
    
Likelihood Ratio Test  36.1**   
Percentage of Correct Predictions  75.2%   
* 10%, ** 5% and ***1% level of significance. 
1 The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable reflecting the level of 
investment in soil conservation. 
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Second-Stage Stochastic Production Functions 
 
ALL      HIGH LOW Variable
1 Parameter 
Coef. SD      Coef.  SD Coef.  SD
Constant  β0 -3.045***  0.492  -4.208***  0.547  -3.018***  0.325 
Land  βL 0.078*  0.054  0.144*  0.080  0.047*  0.027 
Purchased Inputs  βC 0.244***  0.098  0.243***  0.098  0.254***  0.111 
Family Labor  βF 0.312***  0.048  0.326***  0.062  0.228**  0.108 
Hired Labor  βH 0.109  0.079  0.076  0.077  0.144*  0.080 
Adults  βA 0.078*  0.028  0.089**  0.038  0.081**  0.040 
Slope  βS 0.009  0.009  0.011  0.014  0.005  0.012 
W1 σ10 --  --  0.163*  0.094  --  -- 
W2 σ20 --  --  --  --  0.218*  0.136 
PAES 1  β1 0.301***  0.082  0.323***  0.078  0.277***  0.083 
PAES 2  β2 0.316***  0.094  0.322***  0.071  0.297***  0.112 
PAES 3  β3 0.228**  0.108  0.291**  0.153  0.111**  0.055 
Quadratic and interaction terms excluded due to space limitations 
Inefficiency Model  
Constant   δ0 -2.985*     
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
1.268 -2.794***
 
0.757  1.781*  0.988 
Age  δA 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.003  0.005  0.007 
Education  δE -0.412*** 0.175 -0.715** 0.340  -0.301**  0.126 
Gender  δG -0.996** 0.504 0.708** 0.317  -0.729**  0.365 
Frequency  δV -0.439* 0.237 -0.312* 0.162  0.201**  0.088 
Years   δY 0.104 0.154 0.031 0.038  0.036  0.050 
Credit  δC -0.215 0.447 -0.211 0.196  -0.227*  0.134 
Ownership  δT 0.701 0.558 0.598* 0.311  0.111  0.120 
Participation  δP -0.235 0.344 -0.122 0.136  -0.076  0.210 
       
Sigma-squared  σ
2 0.621***  0.128  0.842***  0.111  0.595***  0.066 
Gamma  γ  0.805***  0.051 
 
0.672***  0.071  0.832***  0.048 
log-likelihood    -540.85   
    
-675.36  -715.89   
Mean TE    0.77 0.83   0.74   
Returns to Scale    0.82     0.87   0.75   
* 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. 
1 The dependent variable is total household income, measured in US dollars.
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TABLE V 
Inefficiency Effects Hypothesis Testing 
 
Models  Null 
Hypothesis 
Test  
Statistic  Conclusion 
      
ALL   34.28  Reject 
HIGH  H0: γ =0  27.63 Reject 
LOW   28.34  Reject 
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